

SAFETY IN COACH

PROF/RST

IN CASE OF ACCIDENT OF A PASSENGER CARRYING TRAIN

Passengers Travelling
Inside the Coach

Should be SAFE

Minimize the Injury/Death

IN CASE OF ACCIDENT OF A PASSENGER CARRYING TRAIN

Injury/Death occurs
in the Accident due to

Fire

Derailment/Collision

CRASH/COLLISION VS FIRE

Contrary to Popular Thinking

Fire a Smaller Disaster – Slower Disaster

Derailment/Collisions Happen in

A Fraction of Second – No Escape.

Fire Happens Slowly

Giving a Few Minutes to Act and Escape

Crash is Followed by Relief

But, Fire can be Fought as It happens.

FIRE IN MOVING TRAINS

Significant Effects

Destroys Completely in a Few Minutes

Deaths or Incapacitation (Followed by Death)

Can happen in Two Minutes

No External Rescue can be Arranged

in This Period

Even stopping a train takes longer than

It takes Fire to Kill

WHAT MAKES FIRE ACCIDENT WORSE

Very Violent Propagation

Due to Wind and Open Coach

Moving Train – No Escape

Exit from Coach

Limited due to Overcrowding

Long Stopping Time

No Water Source Nearby

Often Far from Big Town and Roads

No Fire Brigade Help

FIRE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Asphyxiation

Leading Cause of Death

by 3:1 ratio over burns

Generates

Black Impenetrable Smoke (Toxic or not)

Blocks Vision and Stings the Eyes

Smoke Disorients People

STRATEGY FOR FIRE ACCIDENT

Prevention

Quick Detection

Suppression

Evacuation



ATTRIBUTES CAUSING INJURY/DEATH IN CASE OF ACCIDENT

Fire

Spreading Fire Itself

High Temperature

Toxic Smoke from Burning

Poor Visibility due to Smoke

No Escape

FIRE ACCIDENTS

Eva

Risk	Value
Opacity	Visibility never under 4 m
Thermal risk	Temperature in air never over 66 °C Density of heat flux not over 2.5 kW/m ²
Risk of anoxia	Concentration of oxygen never below 16 %
Toxic risk	Concentration of CO never over 1200 ppm

PREVENTION OF INJURY/DEATH DUE TO FIRE

Upgradation of Coach Furnishing Material
for

Fire Retardation

Arrest Toxicity of Smoke

Reduce Thick Smoke

To withstand at High Temperature


Should not Melt/Drop

Char Formation

Controlled Heat Release

OBJECTIVE OF FIRE RETARDENT

Fire Triangle



OBJECTIVE OF FIRE RETARDENT

Burn Slowly

Take Longer Time

For Evacuation of Passengers

For Taking Action for Fire Fighting

Property of Self Extinguishing

When Ignition Source Removed



WHY FIRE RETARDATION

5 Stages of Fire


Ignition

Growth

Flashover

Fully developed fire

Decline



Fire Retardant Material Delay Flashover

FLASHOVER

Flashover

Near-simultaneous Ignition of
Directly Exposed Combustible Material
Certain Organic Materials on Heating
Undergo Thermal Decomposition
Release Flammable Gases
Temperature Driven Event

After Flashover

Fire in fully Developed Stage
Heat Release Rate at Maximum

RDSO STUDIED

The Coach Furnishing Materials to

Improve Fire Retardant Property

Reduce the Toxicity after Burning

Reduce the Thick Smoke

Minimize Maximum Heat Release Rate

And Specifications were made

SPECIFICATIONS

Resistance to Spread of Flame

Class A of Applicable Appendices of
UIC-564-2 OR

Limiting Oxygen Index

Min 35 as per IS: 13501 or IS:13360

Low or Light Smoke

Class A or B of Appendix 15 of UIC-564-2
OR

Toxicity after Burning

<1 as per NCD 1409

Maximum Heat Release

EN 45545-2:2013

THEORY OF FIRE RETARDENT

Fire Retardant Material

Promote Endothermic Reaction

Forming Protective Layer

Releasing Water or Carbon Dioxide

Char Formation

By adding

Aluminum or Magnesium Hydroxide

Releases Water on Heating

Makes Protective Layers Alumina MgO

Char Formation

Much Harder to Burn

LIMITING OXYGEN INDEX

Percentage of Oxygen in Air Required
To Maintain Fire Propagation
In Test Specimen

The value of index

$$\left(\frac{\text{Oxygen}}{\text{Oxygen} + \text{Nitrogen}} \times 100\right)$$

Specimen Supports

Candle Like Burning

CRITERIA LOW SMOKE

Measurement of Deterioration in Visibility
Due to Smoke

By Passing Light of 100 Lux

E_4 (Lux) T (Lux min)	$E_4 \geq 50$	$20 \leq E_4 < 50$	$E_4 < 20$
$T \geq 300$	A	B	B
$150 \leq T < 300$	B	B	C
$T < 150$	C	C	C

E_4 – Intensity of Light after 4 min. (Lux)

T – Area of Intensity vs Time Graph (Lux-Min)

Important for Evacuation of Passengers

TOXICITY

Measured after Heating of Specimen at 1200°C

Collection of Gases

Analysis of Gases Collected

Mandated Less than 1 of NCD 1409

Toxicity Level < 1 of NCD 1409

Permit 25-30 min for Safe Evacuation



TOXICITY

(As per NCD 1409)

SN	Name of the Gas	Toxicity concentrations in ppm
1	Carbon Dioxide (CO ₂)	100000
2	Carbon Monoxide (CO)	4000
3	Hydrogen Fluoride (HF)	100
4	Hydrogen chloride (HCl)	500
5	Hydrogen Bromide (HBr)	150
6	Hydrogen Cyanide (HCN)	150
7	Nitrogen Oxide (NO, NO ₂)	250
8	Sulphur Dioxide (SO ₂)	400
9	Formaldehyde (HCHO)	500
10	Ammonia (NH ₃)	750
11	Acrylonitrile (CH ₂ CHCN)	400
12	Hydrogen Sulphide (H ₂ S)	750
13	Phenol (C ₆ H ₅ OH)	250
14	Phosgene (COCl ₂)	25

CONTROLLED HEAT RELEASE

Heat Released is determined with
Cone Calorimeter Test as per ISO 5660

Calculation of Parameter

Heat Released

Maximum Heat Released

Time to reach Maximum



FOLLOWING ITEMS SPECIFICATION UPGRADAD BY RDSO

Wood Based Impregnated Compressed
Laminates

Fire Retardant Upholstery

Fire Retardant Curtains

FRP Doors of Coaches

Modular Toilets

Natural Fiber Thermoset Composite
Sheet for Roof Panelling

FOLLOWING ITEMS SPECIFICATION UPGRADAD BY RDSO (Contd...)

Pre-laminated Shaded Compreg

Decorative Thermosetting Synthetic Resin
Bonded Laminated Sheet

Non-asbestos Limpet Sheet for Roof Ceiling
Flexible Vinyl Flooring

Densified Thermal Bonded Polyester Blocks
for Seats and Berths

Vinyl Coated Upholstery Fabric for Seat and
Berth

FOLLOWING ITEMS SPECIFICATION UPGRADAD BY RDSO (Contd...)

Sheet Molding Compound for FRP Product

Fiber Glass Reinforced Plastic Window

Sheet Molding Compound Window Guide,
Sills and Cross Members

Flexible Load Bearing Polyurethane Foam
Cushion

UIC Type Elastomer Flange Connection
Vestibule

DEVELOPMENT OF FIRE BARRIER IN LHB COACHES

Fire Barrier in End Vestibule Door

Door will be closed as Temperature rises

Sealed by Mastic Sealing

Prevents Passengers rushing towards
Fire affected coach

QUICK DETECTION

Very Early Smoke and Fire Detection System

RDSO/20 08/CG-04 (Rev.-3)	STR for Aspiration Type Automatic Smoke Fire detection with Alarm System for AC Coaches (EOG)
RDSO/20 13/CG-06	STR for Automatic Smoke Fire detection cum Manual Suppression System for Pantry Car & Power Car (ICF and LHB Design)

ASPIRATION TYPE AUTOMATIC SMOKE FIRE DETECTION WITH ALARM SYSTEM FOR AC COACHES (EOG)

Capable of Early Warning
Detection System in Coach Communicating
with Centralized Control Panel
Draws Air Sample from
Monitored Environment
Through Aspirator Network

Heat Detection Units
Installed in

Humsafar Coach

JAT Rajdhani

ASPIRATION TYPE AUTOMATIC SMOKE FIRE DETECTION WITH ALARM SYSTEM FOR AC COACHES (EOG)

Working Principle

Capturing Air Samples by Creating Suction

Filtering of Dust to avoid False Alarm

Highly Sensitive Laser Detection Unit

Nephelometer

Check by Light Scattered by

Smoke Particle

Can Detect Smoke before being Visible

Aspiration Type Automatic Smoke Fire detection with Alarm System

	Threshold Settings for						
	AC Coaches		Pantry Car		Power Car		
Alarm	Threshold (% obs/m)	Delay Period (Sec.)	Threshold (% obs/m)		Delay Period (Sec.)	Threshold (% obs/m)	Delay Period (Sec.)
			Day	Night			
Alert	0.35	20	1.0	0.35	30	0.5	45
Action	0.6	30	1.2	0.6	30	0.8	30
Fire-1	1.6	45	1.8	1.6	45	1.6	45
Fire-2	3.0	10	3.0	3.0	10	3.0	10

Aspiration Type Automatic Smoke Fire detection with Alarm System for AC Coaches (EOG)

Four Level Alarm

- Alert – No Signal in Coach
Visual Signal at CMS
- Action – Audio Visual Signal at CMS
Flasher at Coach
- Fire 1 – Automatic Brake Application
Hooter after delay of 55 Sec.

Automatic Smoke Fire detection with Alarm & Suppression System for Pantry Car/Power Car

Fire/Smoke Detection Sensors

Heat Detection Sensors

Fire Suppression System

Water Mist Fire Fighting Equipment

Operation of Lever Manually

Cylinders of 50 Ltrs

Containing 33 Ltrs Water

Nitrogen Gas for Pressurizing

Automatic Smoke Fire detection with Alarm & Suppression System for Pantry Car/Power Car

Alarm

In Pantry Car Manager Room

In Escorting Staff Room

Physically Checking

Switching Off Electrical Equipment

Releasing of Lever Manually

of Fire Suppression System

EVACUATION

Fluorescent Signage

Visible even in Low Light

Emergency Exit Windows

AC coaches 1220MM x 610MM

Non-AC coaches 590 MMx610MM

S. No.	Type of Coach	No. of Emergency Exit/ Emergency Windows
1.	GS Coach	4
2.	SCN coach	4
3.	ACCN coach	4
4.	ACCW coach	4
5.	FAC	all coupe

ATTRIBUTES CAUSING INJURY/DEATH IN CASE OF ACCIDENT (Contd...)

Derailment/Collision

Impact

Hitting by Internal Fittings

No Escape in case of Capsize

Climbing of Coach over Other

ATTEMPT TO REDUCE INJURY/DEATH IN CASE OF DERAILMENT/COLLISION

Reduction in Impact

Anti-Climbing Feature

Injury Free Fittings

Provision to Escape



ATTEMPT TO REDUCE INJURY/DEATH IN CASE OF DERAILMENT (Contd...)

Crashworthiness

Ability of Structure to Protect
Its Occupants during Impact

Body Structure Includes Progressive
Crush Zones to Absorb

Crash Kinetic Energy



CRASHWORTHINESS - OBJECTIVES

No Deformation in Passenger Occupied Areas

No Climbing of Coaches one over the Other

Energy Absorption in Non-Passenger Areas

Controlled and Progressive Collapse
of Coach Structure

Low Decelerations

To avoid Injuries to Occupants

Due to Secondary Impacts

(Impact with Coach Interiors)

CRASHWORTHY DESIGN

Absorb Collision Energy in

Controlled and Predictive Manner

Reduce the Risk of Over-riding

Maintain

Survival Space and

Structural Integrity of Occupied Areas

Limit the Deceleration

Reduce the Risk of Derailment

CRASHWORTHY DESIGN

GENERAL PRINCIPLES EN 15227

Coaches defined as Category C1

To be tested for Collision Scenarios

with Identical Train Unit at

Collision Speed of 36 kmph

Mean Longitudinal Deceleration

to be Limited to 5g to 7.5g

CRASHWORTHY DESIGN ON IR

RDSO took up the Exercise of
Crashworthy Coach Design in 2004

RITES along with
M/s Transportation Technology Center
Applied Research Associates, (ARA)
helped establish

Crashworthy Coach Design Centre



CRASHWORTHINESS

Crash Test of Modified Coach LHB

Done at RDSO at Speed 43.2 kmph
against Concrete Wall Loaded Wagon

Coach Absorbed Energy without Affecting
Passenger Area

Crash Test of Modified ICF Coach was done
in 2006 and was Successful

CRASHWORTHINESS (Contd...)

Crash Test of Coach LHB

Coach has Crumble Zone in Both end to Absorb Energy

Achieved by Provision of Honeycomb Structure as Primary Shock Absorber

Honeycomb Structure Provided Behind Backstop of CBC

CRASHWORTHINESS (Contd...)

Modification Done for Making Crashworthy

- Incorporation of Sacrificial Elements

 - Located away from Passenger Area

- Provision of H Type CBC

 - Prevent Uncoupling

 - Directing the Force to Couplers

 - Anti Climbing Feature

- Honeycomb Structure between

 - CBC Rear Stop & Body Bolster

- Buckle Initiator with Elongated Hole

 - Behind Draft Gear

CRASHWORTHINESS (Contd...)

Modification Done for Making Crashworthy

Extension of Centre Sill upto Body Bolster

To Accommodate Honeycomb

Strengthening of Door Cut Out & Doorway

To Prevent Collapsing of Door

Top Plate 6 mm Replaced by

4 mm Plate in Lavatory

2 mm Plate Beside Centre Sill

CRASHWORTHINESS (Contd...)

Working of Honeycomb Mechanism

At Force of 2000 KN at Coupler

Backstop Bolt will be snapped

Coupler Mechanism will act as Ram

Against Honeycomb

Plastic Deformation of Honeycomb


Gradual Absorption of Crash Energy

[Illustration1](#)

[Illustration2](#)


Modelling of LHB Coach for Crash Simulation

Primary Energy Absorber
(Honeycomb)



Shear back arrangement
(rear stopper + shear
bolts)

Modelling of LHB coach for crash simulation



PRIMARY ENERGY ABSORBER (HONEYCOMB)



Steel Honeycomb
(Indigenous)




Aluminium Honeycomb
(Imported)

CRASHWORTHY DESIGN METHODOLOGY

Crash Simulations of ICF GS Coach





Baseline GS coach crush behavior with side buffers.





Modified crashworthy GS coach crash behavior.

CRASHWORTHY DESIGN METHODOLOGY

Crash Simulations of LHB GS Coach



Baseline LHB GS coach
crash behavior.



Modified crashworthy LHB
GS coach crash behavior.

CRASHWORTHY DESIGN

Platen Car Ramp Test LHB GS Coach



H-TYPE COUPLER TO PREVENT CLIMBING OF COACH OVER ANOTHER



CRASHWORTHINESS (Contd...)

Crash Test of Modified Coach LHB

Done at RDSO at Speed 43.2 kmph
against Concrete Wall Loaded Wagon

Energy Developed during Collision - 2.4 MJ

Energy Absorbed by Draft Gear - 45 KJ

Energy Absorbed by Rear Stop - 41 KJ

Energy Absorbed by Primary Absorber - 720 KJ

Energy Absorbed by Secondary Absorber - 470 KJ

Total Energy Absorbed - 1.2 MJ

Kinetic Energy of Combined Coach & Wagon - 0.6 MJ

Remaining Energy to be Absorbed by Coach - 0.6 MJ

ATTEMPT TO REDUCE INJURY/DEATH IN CASE OF DERAILMENT (Contd...)

Injury Free Fittings

Flush in Type Reading Light

Handles Ladders Covered with Foam

Foldable Ladder in First AC

Sharp Edge of Seats Berths Rounded

Flush in Type Snack Tray

BEFORE

Fixed type coat hook on Lavatory doors



AFTER

Swivel type coat hook on lavatory door



Before

Protruding soap tray with sharp corners



After

Sunk in Stainless steel mirror shelf



Before

Projecting type handles on Water Tank arch



After

Folding type handles on Water Tank arch



Before

Fixed type coat hook on compartment
partition



After

Swivel type coat hook on compartment partition



Head rest for upper berth at head side



PU Foam moulded safety railing for upper berth



Before

Metal Ladder for climbing upper berth



After

PU Foam moulded Ladder for climbing upper berth



Aftertype latch for single seat back rest

BEFORE -Projecting Button type latch design



Before

Single seat retaining bracket



Now

Pin type latch for single seat back rest

ICF SR CN 04288



Before

Metal Suspension strap (sharp corners) without PU foam coating for upper Berth



Suspension strap with PU foam coating for Upper Berth

After



Before

Wire rope for luggage locking on lower berth



After

Foldable rings for luggage locking on lower berth



Before

GS, SLR Luggage rack without additional pipe



After

Applicable for Production units only

GS, SLR Luggage rack with additional pipe



Provision of PU Foam cushion on sharp corners of non - rounded berths





Before -

**BANJO Metal Shutter Frame with inside
Projection in Lavatories of Non AC Coaches.**

After- Projecting type Metal frame Banjo shutter arrangement on Non AC lavatory to be replaced by providing rubber sealed window glass as in AC Coaches along with exhaust fan arrangement



Rubber sealed window glass



Exhaust fan arrangement

ATTEMPT TO REDUCE INJURY/DEATH IN CASE OF DERAILMENT (Contd...)

Provision to Escape

Provision of Fluorescent Signage
Quick Identification

Provision of Emergency Window

Removal of Bottom Latch of Doors

EMERGENCY EXITS

Emergency Windows of Size

AC coaches - 1220MM x 610MM

Non-AC coaches - 590 MMx610MM

S. No.	Type of Coach	No. of Emergency Windows	Emergency Exit/
1.	GS Coach	4	
2.	SCN coach	4	
3.	ACCN coach	4	
4.	ACCW coach	4	
5.	FAC		all coupe

Thanks

